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INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 1987, David Mooney, a homeless man, allegedly robbed
and murdered a man in Branford, Connecticut, to pay a drug debt to an
accomplice.1 A week after the victim's nude body was discovered, the
police arrested the accomplice,2 an admitted drug dealer, as he was driv-
ing the victim's car. Based on information received from this accom-
plice, the police issued an arrest warrant for Mooney, who was arrested
on the night of August 5, 1987. Later that night, Mooney's girlfriend
took a police officer to a bridge underpass where Mooney had been living
at the time of the murder. At the underpass, the officer found several
items, including a duffel bag, a closed cardboard box, and a suitcase. The
officer opened the duffel bag and found a large quantity of quarters, but
did not open the other items at that time. After an evidence officer came
to the scene, the two officers photographed and tagged the items and
took them to the police station where they were opened and inventoried. 3
At trial, Mooney made two arguments for the suppression of the
evidence obtained through the warrantless search of his belongings:
First, the police violated Mooney's rights under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, 4 when they invaded his "home" under
1. State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 149 (Conn.), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991). Witnesses
testified at trial that Mooney "hustled" gay men to obtain money and drugs. Brief for Respondent at
3, Mooney (No. 13,737). After Mooney and the victim took a shower together, Mooney began beat-
ing the victim. Then, while Mooney strangled the victim with an electric clock cord, the accomplice
robbed the condominium, taking a VCR, a quantity of coins, and some other items. Id. at 2-4.
2. The accomplice was tried separately and convicted of felony murder, first-degree robbery,
and first-degree burglary. Brief for Respondent at 2 n.2, Mooney (No. 13,737).
3. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 150-51.
4. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
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the bridge abutment without a warrant; 5 and second, the police violated
his Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his closed containers
found under the abutment.6 The court denied Mooney's motion to sup-
press the evidence, and he was convicted upon a jury trial of felony mur-
der and robbery in the first degree.7 Mooney appealed to the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, which reversed the judgment,8 holding that the
closed container search violated Mooney's Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against unlawful search and seizure.9 The court never decided the
first issue regarding the defendant's "home" because it found merit in his
second claim. However, the court assumed as true the state's contention
that the defendant could not manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his "home." 10 Mooney raised the legal questions of whether homeless
people can assert legitimate Fourth Amendment rights to their "homes"
and whether they can reasonably expect privacy in the contents of their
belongings left unattended.
Any attempt to define what protection is available under the Fourth
Amendment must start with the landmark case of Katz v. United
States.II In Katz, the United States Supreme Court reformulated its test
for determining whether a warrantless police search violates the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court turned away from the traditional approach to illegal search and
seizure and formed a "privacy" analysis. 12 Traditionally, the Court had
examined the area searched to determine whether it was "constitution-
ally protected."' 13 In Katz, the Court adopted a two-part "privacy" test,
determining whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in the searched subject matter, and whether this expectation is one
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or afflirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although Mooney also claimed that the search violated article I, section 7
of the Connecticut Constitution's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures, he presented no
separate analysis to that end. See Mooney, 588 A.2d at 150 n.5. The court declined to consider his
claim under the Connecticut Constitution and did not resolve whether greater protection could be
found there. Id.
5. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 150.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 149. Mooney was sentenced to sixty years imprisonment, to be suspended after fifty
years. Brief for Respondent at 1, Mooney (No. 13,737).
8. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149.
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id. at 152.
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz involved a wiretap on a public telephone booth that the defend-
ant used to communicate wagers in violation of a federal statute. IdL at 348.
12. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The approach set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion was adopted by the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
13. See infra Part I(A).
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society is willing to accept as reasonable.1 4 This test later came to be
known as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.15
The Katz test allowed the Court to overcome the often undesirable
logical consequences of the "constitutionally protected area" standard,
but practical application of the test proved difficult without an examina-
tion of the defendants' underlying property interests.16 Although Katz
sought to escape the property-based criteria of the "constitutionally pro-
tected area" formulation, these factors are essential in determining the
reasonable expectation of a criminal defendant. For example, the Court
held in California v. Greenwood17 that a warrantless search of closed
trash bags left at the curb did not violate the defendant's rights because
he had abandoned the bags for Fourth Amendment purposes", and
therefore could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
contents. Other courts have used the Katz framework to allow warrant-
less searches of closed belongings left temporarily unattended. 19
Mooney is one of the latest cases illustrating a jurisprudential diffi-
culty in applying the Supreme Court's current search and seizure doc-
trine. The Supreme Court of Connecticut's conclusion, that Mooney, a
14. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
15. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. The test set out in Katz could be read to imply that society must
weigh the subjective expectation of the defendant and determine its reasonableness given the defend-
ant's circumstances. The Court does not apply Katz in this way. Instead, the "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" test is an objective one that ascertains whether the search infringes on the societal
values protected by the Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
16. For the purposes of this Note, I will consider only two types of property interests-proprie-
tary (i.e., ownership-derived rights) and possessory (i.e., rights derived from the power to exclude
others from items or areas legally possessed, though not necessarily accompanied by title). See
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1165, 1219 (6th ed. 1990). Proprietary interests will often prove insuffi-
cient to create a legitimate Fourth Amendment right. See infra note 82. Interestingly, although
proprietary rights supersede possessory rights in a property dispute, possessory interests are more
powerful in a Fourth Amendment context because the right to exclude others is more closely associ-
ated with the principles that the Amendment protects. Nevertheless, even a possessory interest may
not be enough to create a legitimate Fourth Amendment interest. See infra notes 83-85 and accom-
panying text.
17. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
18. Although the traditional definition of abandonment requires an intent to relinquish owner-
ship, see BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 16, at 2, courts have held that the test for intent in
a Fourth Amendment context is an objective one, determined by the actions of the defendant. See,
e.g., United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Conduct is considered abandon-
ment in the context of search and seizure when it exposes an ordinarily private possession to the
scrutiny of the public-even if the defendant does not intend to relinquish ownership. See id.; infra
Part III(C).
19. E.g., Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846-47 (expectation of privacy in gym bag left behind in a public
hallway held not to have been reasonable even though defendant intended to return to retrieve bag);
see also United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in cave located on public land); infra text accompanying notes 152-55.
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homeless defendant, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of his closed containers left under a bridge underpass, violates the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Greenwood that closed but aban-
doned containers are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Further-
more, the court ignored the Supreme Court's holdings in Oliver v. United
States20 and California v. Ciraolo21 that open areas are not conducive to
Fourth Amendment protection. Yet despite conflicting authorities on
how to deal with these types of searches, and the magnitude of the home-
lessness problem in America, 22 the Supreme Court denied review. 23 The
purpose of this Note is to analyze the "reasonable expectation" standard
and assess the implications of this standard with regard to homeless
persons.
Part I of this Note traces the historical underpinnings of the current
"reasonable expectation" standard, from the traditional "constitutionally
protected area" approach to the Katz reformulation of search and seizure
into a privacy concept. Part II argues that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently used property interests as a gauge for whether a person has a
legitimate interest that the Fourth Amendment will protect. Part II, fur-
thermore, concludes that such property inquiries are appropriate and
necessary. Part III discusses the various post-Katz cases which examine
property interests in order to assess Fourth Amendment interests. In
particular, Part III analyzes various types of cases that shed light on the
homeless person's Fourth Amendment interest, including cases that in-
volve searches of open fields,24 closed container searches, 25 searches of
abandoned items, 26 and searches of trespassers' belongings. 27 Part IV
20. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
21. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
22. Statistics reveal that homelessness has dramatically increased during the last decade. See
Connecticut Coalition for the Homeless, Who Is Homeless in Connecticut? reprinted in Brief of the
Defendant-Appellant at Appendix 19A, State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991) (No. 13,737)
(reporting that homelessness in Connecticut increased 14% from 1988 to 1989 based on shelter
usage); United States Conference of Mayors, A Status Report on Homelessness in America's Cities:
1989, reprinted in Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at Appendix 25A, 27A, Mooney (No. 13,737)
(reporting that requests for emergency shelter increased an average of 25% in 27 survey cities). But
see Jay Mathews, Rethinking Homeless Myths, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1992, at 29 ("[The nation is
almost over the homeless hump.").
23. Connecticut v. Mooney, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991). Instead of a retrial, Mooney pleaded no
contest to first-degree manslaughter and received a fifteen-year sentence, to be suspended after seven
years. Homeless Man Could Be Released, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 8, 1992, at BI 1. Because he
has already spent five years in jail during his appeal, he will be eligible for parole in late 1992. Id.
24. See infra Part III(A).
25. See infra Part III(B).
26. See infra Part III(C).
27. See infra Part III(D).
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analyzes the Mooney decision. The Supreme Court of Connecticut ig-
nored the post-Katz case law and misapplied the "reasonable expecta-
tion" standard. Part V concludes that the search conducted in Mooney
was not violative of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because
the defendant could not have manifested a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his belongings left under the public bridge abutment. Katz's
progeny determined that the correct inquiry for Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence-whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy-is properly determined by assessing property interests. The harsh
but necessary consequence of this test is that homeless people will often
be precluded from asserting Fourth Amendment protection.
I. A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
KAZ V UNITED STATES
Search and seizure law in this country has developed greatly over
the last two centuries.28 Much of the recent development of search and
seizure has focused on what constitutes a search.29 As one commentator
has suggested, "[l]aw enforcement practices are not required by the
[F]ourth [A]mendment to be reasonable unless they are either 'searches'
or 'seizures.' "30 Thus, only when the police actions have amounted to
an actual Fourth Amendment search of a defendant's home or belong-
ings has the Court addressed the reasonableness of the intrusion. This
determination was once based on whether the area searched was pro-
tected; after Katz, it was based on the privacy expectation of the
defendant.
28. For a general discussion of the history of search and seizure in England and the United
States, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1987); JAcon W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
The primary focus of this development, however, has not been the issue of the "reasonableness" of a
warrantless search, but rather the creation and refinement of the exclusionary rule, which requires
that evidence obtained from unlawful searches be excluded from trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). For a discussion of the exclusionary rule, see generally Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
29. It should be noted at the outset, however, that the Supreme Court has never sought to
define strictly what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I
LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 2.1(a). The Court has always been hesitant to create rigid guidelines for
Fourth Amendment analyses because search and seizure law must be able to accommodate case-
specific circumstances.
30. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
356 (1974).
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A. The Pre-Katz Approach to Warrantless Searches
In the 1920s, police actions did not constitute a search unless there
was a physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area. For exam-
ple, in Olmstead v. United States,31 the Court determined that a wiretap
placed on defendant's telephone line did not amount to a search because
no physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area was shown.
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, concluded that there was no
search or seizure because there was no entry into the defendant's house
or office.32 Thus the majority delineated a construction of the Fourth
Amendment requiring a physical invasion of a protected area.
Justice Brandeis argued in his dissent, however, that the Constitu-
tion must keep in step with the times: "When the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments were adopted, 'the form that evil had theretofore taken'
had been necessarily simple."'33 Because "[s]ubtler and more far-reach-
ing" 34 methods of obtaining evidence are available with modem technol-
ogy, Justice Brandeis continued, the Fourth Amendment must be
construed as a general right to privacy: "[T]he right to be let alone...
[is] the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individ-
ual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. ' 35 Justice Brandeis concluded that the location of
the wiretap was immaterial. 36 In his view, the physical invasion need not
violate a protected area to invoke Fourth Amendment protection as long
as the physical invasion violated a privacy right. But even this view,
31. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
32. Id. at 464. Chief Justice Taft's belief in a "physical penetration" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment forced him to almost absurd results: "The reasonable view is that one who installs in
his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite
outside, and that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 466 (emphasis added). It is unlikely that the use
of new technology to transmit private conversations is intended to be broadcasted as if shouted out a
window. Compare Chief Justice Taft's view of the role of increased technology in Fourth Amend-
ment analysis to that of the dissenting Justice Brandeis: "Ways may some day be developed by
which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court
.... Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?" Id. at 474 (Brandeis, I., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 478-79. Compare this view to that in Katz: "[Tihe Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967).
36. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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advocating a privacy approach to Fourth Amendment analysis, utilized
the physical intrusion model.37
The issue of non-physical searches posed serious difficulties for the
Fourth Amendment status quo. This inability to move beyond the physi-
cal intrusion test forced the Olmstead Court to liken the use of a tele-
phone to shouting out a window.38 Yet it seems clear that use of a
telephone cannot be equated with a general waiver of privacy. Equally
ridiculous were the positions espoused by the Olmstead dissenters who
were forced either to interpret the Fourth Amendment as granting a gen-
eral right to privacy 39 or to provide a physical explanation of non-physi-
cal invasions.40 All three positions proved to be undesirable.
Electronic surveillance cases continued to trouble the Court. In
Olmstead, the Court established the "physical invasion" standard; yet as
technology advanced, it became easier to eavesdrop without physical in-
trusion. In Goldman v. United States,41 the police placed a "detecta-
phone"42 on the other side of a party wall to listen to conversations
conducted in the adjoining office. The Court determined that the police's
conduct did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment because
"the eavesdropping had not been accomplished by means of an unauthor-
ized physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area."'43
Because the electronic device was placed on the other side of the party
wall (and therefore not in the defendant's protected area), the conduct
did not constitute a search.
In Silverman v. United States,44 the police placed a "spike mike"45
in the heating ducts of the defendant's house. Because there was an ac-
tual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, the Court concluded
that the conduct constituted a search violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment.46 The concurring Justice Douglas, although agreeing that the
search was illegal, began to question the wisdom of the physical intrusion
standard:
37. Justice Butler went even further in using the physical intrusion model: "ITlhe exclusive use
of the wire belongs to the persons served by it." Id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
38. See supra note 32.
39. See supra text accompanying note 35.
40. See supra note 37.
41. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
42. A detectaphone is an electronic listening device that amplifies sound from a particular di-
rection. See id. at 131.
43. Id. at 134-35; see also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (holding that secretly
recorded conversations with a federal officer were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because
no physical invasion occurred).
44. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
45. A spike mike amplifies all sound within a given radius. See id. at 506.
46. Id. at 512.
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An electronic device on the outside wall of a house is a permissible
invasion of privacy... while an electronic device that penetrates the
wall.., is not.... Our concern should not be with the trivialities of
the local law of trespass . . . . [O]ur sole concern should be with
whether the privacy of the home was invaded.47
Even this approach, however, utilized the physical invasion model by
dealing with the privacy of the area searched, not the expectations of the
defendant. 48
The electronic surveillance cases forced the Court to question seri-
ously its underlying Fourth Amendment philosophy. As the protection
against unlawful search and seizure had developed from the common law
trespass doctrine, the physical intrusion model served the Court well
when the typical search involved an invasion of the home or office. Elec-
tronic surveillance presented difficulties never contemplated by the draft-
ers of the Fourth Amendment.4 9 With Katz, the Court adopted a new
approach to analyzing searches-focusing on the reasonable expectation
of the defendant instead of on the physical penetration of a constitution-
ally protected area. Although this approach is sensible, the Court still
must look to property interests to determine whether the expectation of
privacy is reasonable.
B. The Katz Reformulation: The Abandonment of the Property-Based
Analysis
The Court's difficulty in dealing with electronic surveillance cases
was due to the inadequacy of the "physical invasion" standard. In Katz
v. United States,50 the Court finally abandoned this standard, replacing it
with a privacy approach similar to the one Justice Brandeis had advo-
cated forty years earlier in his Olmstead dissent. In Katz, the defendant
was convicted of transmitting wagers by wire across state lines. FBI
agents intercepted the transmission by placing a wiretap on the public
phone booth where Katz was communicating these wagers.51 The issue
before the Court went to the heart of the Fourth Amendment debate: Is
a public telephone booth a constitutionally protected area, and if so,
47. Id. at 512-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. See I LAFAvE, supra note 28, § 2.1(a). LaFave discusses the pre-Katz Supreme Court
cases in which various areas mentioned by the Fourth Amendment were held to be protected:
"'persons,' including the bodies and clothing of individuals; 'houses,' including apartments, hotel
rooms, garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses; 'papers,' such as letters; and 'effects,' such
as automobiles." Id. (citations omitted); cf Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (holding that a
jail cell is not a constitutionally protected area).
49. But cf Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the Framers were aware of
the practice of eavesdropping).
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. Id. at 348.
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must the electronic surveillance physically penetrate the area to invoke
Fourth Amendment protection?
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,52 rejected this formulation
of the issue: "[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally
protected area.' 53 According to Justice Stewart, search and seizure
analysis should not focus on the area that is searched, but rather on the
reasonable expectation of the defendant.5 4 It is reasonable to assume that
a defendant who enters a phone booth does not expect to broadcast his
conversation to the world. 55 Thus, any interception of such conversa-
tion, made without a warrant,56 is a violation of the Fourth Amendment
as long as the defendant manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court also rejected the requirement of a physical invasion, explicitly
overruling Goldman.57 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, ex-
plained the new test: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' "58
C. Interpreting Katz
The command of Katz seemed clear: No warrantless search was
lawful if the accused manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the item searched. However, the application of the reasonable expecta-
tion standard was anything but clear. Indeed, commentators have been
struggling with the Katz test for years. This Section explains four impor-
tant aspects of this test that must be considered when applying Katz.
First, although the Katz test requires that two criteria be met, the focus
of the Katz test is on the reasonable expectation component and not on
52. In a case before eight Justices, five opinions were written. Justice Stewart wrote for the
majority; Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion (joined by Justice Brennan); Justice
Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion; Justice White wrote a separate concurring opinion; and
Justice Black dissented. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration of the case.
53. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
54. "[Ihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351.
55. Id. at 352.
56. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967) (stating that the judiciary may, under
certain circumstances, issue warrants to place wiretaps on phone lines).
57. "[Ihe absence of [a] penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth
Amendment inquiry . . . [but] the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion. ... Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53. But see id. at 366 (Black, J.,
dissenting): "[T]he Framers were aware of this practice [eavesdropping], and if they had desired to
outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping .... they would have used the
appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment."
58. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the subjective expectation component.59 As one commentator points out,
"[a]n actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a
statement of what Katz held .... If it [did], the government could dimin-
ish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
... [that] we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive elec-
tronic surveillance." 6 This message would effectively put us all on no-
tice that our homes and belongings could be searched at any time.
Anyone who heard (and believed) this message could not actually expect
privacy. To avoid this absurd result, the only real question should be
whether the defendant manifested an expectation of privacy that is rea-
sonable in society's eyes.61
59. See Eric D. Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Cur-
tains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. RIEv. 725, 753 (1985). Another way of viewing the first
component is that the defendant must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy, not merely have
such an expectation. Id at 743.
60. Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 384.
61. Justice Harlan ultimately recognized that the subjective expectation was not as important
as the objective reasonableness. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("The analysis must... transcend the search for subjective expectations."). As LaFave
notes, "the point is sometimes missed by lower courts." I LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 2.1(c) n.66
(citing Gillet v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that defendant's lack of
subjective expectation of privacy could defeat his Fourth Amendment rights)).
Applying Ockham's razor we can eliminate the requirement of a subjective expectation alto-
gether. A defendant possessing neither a subjective nor an objective expectation of privacy obviously
would not be protected by the Fourth Amendment. A defendant possessing both a subjective and an
objective expectation of privacy obviously would be protected. However, a defendant possessing
only a subjective expectation (he honestly believes his belongings will remain private) but not an
objective expectation (he honestly believes his belongings will remain private while left unattended at
a kleptomaniacs convention) would not receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment if a police
officer should discover and open the belongings. Such a defendant fails the objective test because his
behavior (leaving the belongings unattended where they are likely to be inspected) does not exhibit
an expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable. What about a defendant who believes that
his belongings will not remain private, but otherwise exhibits behavior suggesting an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy? For example, if a man actually believes that the police will break
into his home without a warrant and search his belongings, but he takes every precaution to ensure
that they remain private (in this case, leaving them at home would be enough), will his lack of a
subjective expectation of privacy prevent the Fourth Amendment from protecting him? Clearly not.
Thus, the subjective component to Katz's two-part test can and should be ignored. Katz only re-
quires an objective (i.e., reasonable) expectation of privacy determined by societal standards.
Because the objective determination is based on society's perception of what constitutes a rea-
sonable expectation, the test is not "objective" in the strictest sense of the word. At best, Katz
requires an "inter-subjective" examination of the privacy expectation. An inter-subjective test only
requires agreement among members of society, not logical conclusions derived from first principles.
For a discussion of the differences between "subjective," "inter-subjective," and "objective" criteria,
see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 6-22, 62-78 (2d ed. 1984); J.L. Mackie, The Subjectivity
of Values, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 95, 99-102, 105-09 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988);
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, The Many Moral Realisms, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM, supra, at 1,
14-22. The importance of Katz's inter-subjectivism is that the requirements of reasonableness may
change over time as society adopts new standards of morality and justice.
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Second, a defendant must produce more than just a "reasonable ex-
pectation" in order to rely on Fourth Amendment protection. In United
States v. White, 62 the Court characterized the Katz test as requiring "jus-
tifiable" 63 expectations, which are "[those] expectations the Fourth
Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant."' Thus, a crimi-
nal, having taken steps to ensure that his actions were safe from inspec-
tion, may have a reasonable expectation of privacy. But these actions
would not necessarily be sufficient to receive Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. As one commentator illustrates:
If two narcotics peddlers were to rely on the privacy of a desolate cor-
ner of Central Park in the middle of the night to carry out an illegal
transaction, this would be a reasonable expectation of privacy; there
would be virtually no risk of discovery. Yet if by extraordinary good
luck a patrolman were to illuminate the desolate spot with his flash-
light, the criminals would be unable to suppress the officer's testimony
as a violation of their rights under the fourth amendment.65
Thus, carefully concealed criminal evidence is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment although the expectation of privacy may be "reason-
able" under the circumstances. Likewise, non-criminal activities may
not be protected by the Fourth Amendment if they do not rise to the
level of a societally protected interest: The privacy expectation must be
one that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "66
Third, although the Court rejected the "constitutionally protected
area" standard, an analysis of the defendant's expectations will almost
certainly require reference to the place searched.67 There is no question
62. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
63. The Court uses the terms "legitimate" and "justifiable" alternately to indicate this addi-
tional burden. I will use the term "legitimate."
64. 401 U.S. at 752.
65. Note, From Private Places to Personal Pivacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 983 (1968).
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Not all reasonable expectations of privacy will generate Fourth Amendment protection. Although
society may agree that a defendant exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy by carefully con-
cealing his criminal activities, a defendant will not be protected by the Fourth Amendment in those
instances where his expectation is illegitimate. This requirement creates an even tougher standard
for criminal defendants: To retain the protection of the Fourth Amendment, not only must the
conduct exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy (determined by society's reasonableness stan-
dard), but this expectation must be "legitimate" in some further sense. The content of the term
"legitimate" has never been fully explained by the Court. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
197 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Fourth Amendment... embodies and gives effect to our
collective sense of the degree to which men and women, in civilized society, are entitled 'to be let
alone' by their governments.").
67. Justice Harlan argued that any determination of Fourth Amendment protection "requires
reference to a 'place.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Whether Fourth Amend-
ment challenges can be resolved without reference to the area searched is doubtful. Because the Katz
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that a person can have a privacy interest outside the traditionally pro-
tected area as long as the expectation of privacy in the object is reason-
able.68 However, any estimation of the reasonableness of the defendant's
expectation must make some reference to the place. The location of the
search is relevant to the extent that it affects the expectations of the de-
fendant. In fact, to determine whether a defendant had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, it is necessary to examine the surrounding
circumstances. 69 Not only will the location of the search be relevant, but
so will other property-oriented factors, such as the property rights of the
defendant (i.e., proprietary and possessory rights, including the right to
exclude), abandonment of the searched item, and the defendant's status
as a trespasser.70
Fourth, the Katz Court did not replace the old standard with a new
one. Instead, the Court applied an essentially "standardless" test.71
Katz sought to escape a "talismanic solution to every Fourth Amend-
ment problem"72 by using a flexible "reasonable expectation" test. The
test was not to be applied mechanically; rather, the test was meant to
apply to any situation or location, as long as the expectation of privacy is
reasonable in society's eyes. The rationale for Katz's standardless ap-
proach is sound. The Fourth Amendment protects people against intru-
sion. This right is fundamental and is determined by what society values.
In the early years of the Fourth Amendment, the protection extended
only to one's house and office; but as society's understanding of personal
liberty grew, the protection of the Fourth Amendment did as well. The
test depends on the general circumstances of the search and on society's perception of the defend-
ant's expectation of privacy, the place of the search is often highly relevant. So even though "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id at 351, the place searched cannot be ignored. In
Rakas v. Illinois, Justice Rehnquist noted:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy ... must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society.... [O]ne who owns or lawfully
possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy
by virtue of [the] right to exclude [others]. Expectations of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or
personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest.... But by focusing on legitimate
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether
abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy
interests protected by that Amendment.
439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 188-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting); infra text
accompanying note 106-10.
68. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citations
omitted).
69. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. See infra Part III.
71. See Note, Protecting Privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313, 328 (1981).
72. 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
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Fourth Amendment protects people anywhere they are as long as that
privacy interest they possessed at home is still with them. This is one
way of thinking about Katz: The metaphysical legitimacy of the privacy
interest at home extends to certain "reasonable" and "legitimate" cir-
cumstances outside the home. Katz is faithful to the Fourth Amend-
ment's goal of protecting the values that society regards as important.
Any other approach, whether the former "constitutionally protected
area" rule of Olmstead, Goldman, and Silverman, or the overbroad gen-
eral right to privacy suggested by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead, misses
the point of what the Fourth Amendment protects.
The Katz test is difficult to apply because it is not a rule, but an
extension of society's abhorrence of privacy invasion. But because the
test relies on society's perception of the defendant's reasonable expecta-
tion, the law can change with time: What is a reasonable expectation of
privacy today may not, as we shall see, be a reasonable expectation of
privacy tomorrow.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: PROPERTY AS A BASIS FOR PRIVACY
Katz sought to escape the "property-based" theory of Fourth
Amendment analysis, which had focused on the area searched. How-
ever, the standardless framework that Katz set forth forced courts to "fill
in" the details. Katz's focus on the defendant's expectation was logical;
but by requiring that the defendant's expectation of privacy be "reason-
able in society's eyes," some criteria had to be used to determine what
was "reasonable." Because one of the most important rights associated
with ownership of property is the right to exclude others, 73 it made sense
to look to property rights in assessing the individual's right to refuse a
search: Does the individual have the requisite property interest to ex-
clude the police? The four categories involved in Mooney-open fields,
closed containers, abandonment, and trespass-all shed light on an indi-
vidual's property rights. Of course, the interest necessary to exclude the
police from searching one's effects without a warrant is not exactly the
same as a property interest.74 Nevertheless, property interests will be
crucial in any reasonable expectation of a defendant asserting Fourth
Amendment protection.
A. Property Rights as a Basis for Society
"As long as a system of property rights protects and gives meaning
to people's right to be left in peace, individual initiative will produce the
73. See infra note 107.
74. See infra note 82.
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essential elements of human flourishing. ' 75 This proposition-that the
enforcement of property rights will ensure a just society-has been de-
bated for more than two thousand years.76 It is not within the scope of
this Note to further that debate. Nevertheless, it is essential to under-
stand that property rights are the only available measure of a person's
privacy. Every claim to government protection of a privacy interest will
ultimately rest on an individual's right to exclude others from his land,
possessions, or person.
B. Property Rights as a Basis for Fourth Amendment Rights
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has consistently
used property concepts to examine privacy expectations. Katz sought to
escape property-based criteria in determining Fourth Amendment rights.
But in applying Katz's reasonableness test, courts must fall back on ob-
jective criteria. Any assessment of the expectation of a defendant will
ultimately rest upon whether he had a property interest in the object-
whether he abandoned it, whether he was trespassing on another's land,
etc. Katz's focus on the defendant's expectation rather than on the area
searched seemed logical, but the same criteria that were used to assess
whether or not the searched area was constitutionally protected are now
used to "fill in" the reasonableness of the privacy expectation.
Prior to Katz, an individual had to show how the police "invaded" a
constitutionally protected area. The focus was on the requisite property
interest of the defendant and on the law of trespass with regard to the
police conduct. This approach was unsound; the correct approach,
adopted by the Katz Court, focused on the expectation of the defendant.
Katz should not be read to abandon all property inquiries, however-the
reasonableness of the expectation of privacy will depend on these factors.
Instead, Katz must be construed narrowly if it is to be reconciled with
subsequent Supreme Court's decisions. Katz merely shifted the focus of
the Fourth Amendment from the search to the searched. In adopting the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, the Court acknowledged
the importance of the defendant's rights, not the police's actions. Yet the
protection afforded by certain areas still exists today. Instead of labelling
such areas "constitutionally protected," courts refer to them as "espe-
cially conducive" to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The criteria are
the same, only the underlying philosophical approach has changed.
75. DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE PUBLIC GOODS
ARGUMENT 1 (1991).
76. See, eg., Aristotle, The Politics bk. II, ch. 5, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1150-54
(Richard McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941).
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Since Katz, courts have relied on these underlying property princi-
ples to examine the interest of the defendant contesting the warrantless
search. The defendant's legitimate privacy interest will coincide with a
positive entitlement related to some property right. Some property inter-
est must be a precondition to a Fourth Amendment interest. If a person
cannot claim any property interest in an object or place, it is unlikely that
his expectation of privacy will be reasonable. Of course, property inter-
ests of less than full title will often suffice-an invitee to a home,77 a
licensee to an object or place,78 or a bailee to a belonging 79 will all have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their areas or belongings.
The Court has consistently denied that it uses property rights to
assess Fourth Amendment interests.Y° However, in assessing the reason-
able expectation of an individual contesting a warrantless search, courts
must look to positive law, including property rights, to determine the
individual's requisite privacy interest. In the last twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court has merely paid lip service to Katz's abhorrence of prop-
erty-based Fourth Amendment analyses. The Court has regularly used
pre-Katz property criteria to determine the interest of the defendant.8
An individual who possesses no interest in land cannot expect that the
land will not be searched. Likewise, an individual with no property in-
terest in an item cannot expect privacy in that item. 82
77. See, eg., Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that defendant has
standing to object to search of house of third person because defendant was lawfully in house at the
time of the search).
78. Seae eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); infra note 183.
79. See, eg., United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1989); infra note 142.
80. See, eg., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[A]rcane distinctions developed in
property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control.").
81. See California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (holding that location of closed
container in automobile is relevant to the reasonableness of privacy expectation); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (focusing on area in which abandoned trash bags were located);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 190 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (using local trespass law
to justify expectation of privacy); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (discussing "bail-
ment" of drugs to third party in assessing Fourth Amendment rights); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12
("[Tihe Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment."); id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring)
('[P]roperty rights... should be considered in determining whether an individual's expectations of
privacy are reasonable.").
82. See, eg., Sumrall v. United States, 382 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1055 (1968) (defendant did not have standing to contest search of codefendant's purse even though
defendant was present at the time of search); State v. Boutot, 325 A.2d 34 (Me. 1974) (defendant did
not have standing to challenge search of car he had stolen).
To further explain the difference between interests that the Fourth Amendment will protect and
strict property interests, consider the case of a lost wallet. The owner of the wallet retains "title" to
his belongings-he still owns the wallet and its contents even though it is lost. If someone who
knows the true owner should pick it up and keep it, he has committed larceny. Thus, proprietary
interests are very powerful in a property context. The finder has a possessory interest in the wallet,
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A property interest is a necessary condition for Fourth Amendment
protection, but is it a sufficient condition? As Justice Rehnquist stated in
Rakas, "even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular
items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon. '8 3 The in-
terest necessary to prevent a warrantless search must be more than mere
ownership. In Rawlings v. Kentucky,84 the Court acknowledged that an
individual does not have a legitimate privacy interest just because he
owns an item.85 If an individual places an item in "plain view," it is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment.8 6 For example, when an individ-
ual leaves his belongings unattended in a public place, he retains a prop-
erty interest, but relinquishes the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, when an individual exposes an object to public scrutiny, he
loses his expectation of privacy.8 7 Thus the property interest is necessary
to Fourth Amendment protection, but not sufficient. This is not surpris-
ing, given Katz's requirement that the privacy expectation be both rea-
sonable and legitimate. Katz never abandoned the use of property
concepts in assessing Fourth Amendment protection; it merely shifted
the focus of the inquiry from the area of the search to the person being
searched.
III. BUILDING ON KATZ: OPEN FIELDS, CLOSED CONTAINERS,
ABANDONMENT, AND TRESPASS
The Supreme Court began realizing the implications of the Katz test
almost immediately. Using the sparse guidance that Katz provided, the
Court began to develop rules of general reasonableness. Open fields, for
yet this is "trumped" by the owner's interest. If a police officer should pick up the wallet and
"search" its belongings, however, the owner could not suppress evidence obtained from such a
search-the proprietary interest will be useless in that case. The wallet owner did not maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet if thefinder had the wallet on his person when the police
searched it (without warrant or exception to the warrant requirement), he could exclude the evi-
dence as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In a Fourth Amendment context, possessory inter-
ests (in chattel) are more powerful than proprietary interests. Of course, an individual also
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, office, or other private place, but by virtue
of the recognized right to exclude others. The Fourth Amendment protects those privacy interests
that society recognizes as reasonable. Property interests govern the right to exclude others, and this
right determines which privacy interests are reasonable.
83. 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
84. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
85. See id. at 106.
86. For a discussion of the plain view doctrine, see Elsie Romero, Fourth Amendment-Requir-
ing Probable Cause for Searches and Seizures Under the Plain View Doctrine, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 763 (1988); Seth H. Ruzi, Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under
the Open View Doctrine: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 191 (1988).
87. See, eg., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
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example, are generally not protected against governmental intrusion be-
cause the land is subject to the scrutiny of any passers-by; therefore, an
expectation of privacy in such fields would not be reasonable."" If the
object of the search is not the land itself, but an object in possession of
the defendant, closed containers are generally protected because the ex-
pectation of privacy in the interior of objects is reasonable.8 9 When such
belongings are abandoned, however, the closed containers are not gener-
ally protected by the Fourth Amendment because people do not reason-
ably expect privacy in belongings they have discarded or left
unattended.90 Similarly, when an individual trespasses onto another's
land, the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy is necessarily di-
minished.91 Trespassers' expectations may still be reasonable in some sit-
uations,92 but not when the belongings are left on someone else's land.
Understanding how courts deal with these issues is crucial to under-
standing Mooney.
A. Open Fields
Because Mooney lived under a public bridge, an open area accessible
to passers-by, it is important to understand the way in which "open
fields" have been treated in assessing Fourth Amendment rights. In Hes-
ter v. United States,93 the Supreme Court determined that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation when police, trespassing on the defend-
ant's land without a warrant, noticed in an open field several bottles of
"moonshine whiskey" dropped by the defendant in flight. 94 Reasoning
that "[t]he distinction between [open fields] and [one's] house is as old as
the common law," the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
extend to open fields. 95 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected
the defendant's trespass argument: The police's action of trespassing
88. See infra Part 111(A).
89. See infra Part 111(B).
90. See infra Part III(C).
91. See infra Part III(D).
92. For example, a "technical trespasser," such as a child crossing a neighbor's yard on the way
to school, does not consent to police searches merely by stepping on someone else's land. The dis-
tinction is that the technical trespasser has not given up any expectation of privacy in his person or
the objects he possesses. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. The trespass cases discussed in
Part III(D), infra, deal with the expectation of privacy in objects left on another's land or in the land
itself. These are the issues raised by Mooney.
93. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
94. Id. at 58-59. For a more thorough discussion of the open fields doctrine, see generally
Bradley W. Foster, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Right to Privacy: The Flight of the
Fourth Amendment, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 719 (1991).
95. 265 U.S. at 59.
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onto the defendant's land without a warrant did not amount to a search
because the defendant's own acts exposed the bottles to plain view.
96
The "open fields" doctrine created in Hester survived the Katz re-
formulation; an expectation of privacy in an open field is generally unrea-
sonable because any passers-by can readily view the object of the search.
In Oliver v. United States,97 the Court expanded this doctrine. The police
had entered the defendant's field, which was partially enclosed by a
locked gate displaying a "No Trespassing" sign, and found a marijuana
crop.98 The trial court found a reasonable expectation of privacy because
the defendant "[had done] all that could be expected of him to assert his
privacy in the area of farm that was searched." 99 Furthermore, the farm
was located in a secluded area not easily seen by the public. Thus the
trial court concluded that the farm was not an "open" field and, there-
fore, that it deserved Fourth Amendment protection.' °0 The Supreme
Court reasoned, however, that "an individual may not legitimately de-
mand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the
area immediately surrounding the home."10 1 Because Katz protects
"people, not places,"10 2 the issue turns on what expectation of privacy
society will accept:
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interfer-
ence or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the pri-
vacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in
open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are
accessible to the public and police in ways that a home, an office, or
commercial structure would not be.103
96. Id. at 58. As will be shown in Part 111(C), infra, the defendant's "abandonment" of the
searched item prior to the warrantless search often defeats any potential Fourth Amendment claim.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (abandoned trash bags held to be unprotected by
the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (abandoned gym
bag held to be unprotected). The issue of abandonment is crucial to Mooney. See infra notes 200-07
and accompanying text.
97. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
98. Id. at 173.
99. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 23-24, Oliver (No. 85-15)).
100. Id. at 174. The court of appeals reversed, but four dissenting judges argued that the open
fields doctrine did not apply where reasonable efforts were made to exclude the public. United States
v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc). One judge argued that the open fields doc-
trine applied only when the land could actually be viewed by the public. Id. at 373; see Oliver, 466
U.S. at 174 n.3.
101. 466 U.S. at 178.
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
103. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
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The overriding factor in post-Katz analyses is the reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy. In an open field, this expectation cannot be rea-
sonable. The Oliver Court distinguished between the "reasonable" ex-
pectation of privacy and the "legitimate"'10 4 expectation of privacy
required by Katz. The defendant had made every effort to conceal his
crop; and thus it may have been reasonable to expect privacy in such a
remote and secluded place. However, the police did not violate a soci-
etally protected privacy interest. "The test of legitimacy is not whether
the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity. Rather,
the correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon
the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment."10 5
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Oliver outlined the Court's
Fourth Amendment methodology. Although Justice Marshall reached a
different conclusion than the majority in Oliver, his approach to analyz-
ing the privacy expectation of defendants asserting Fourth Amendment
protection is the one generally used by the Court. In determining
whether a defendant's expectation of privacy is reasonable, the Court
looks to various factors. Although there are no steadfast rules, Justice
Marshall categorized three factors to examine in all Fourth Amendment
analyses.
First, we consider whether the expectation at issue is rooted in entitle-
ments defined by positive law. Second, we consider the nature of the
uses to which spaces of the sort in question can be put. Third, we
consider whether the person claiming a privacy interest manifested
that interest to the public in a way that most people would understand
and respect.106
In expounding the first principle, the Court looked to property rights as
the type of positive law that creates privacy interests. One of the most
important rights associated with ownership is the right to exclude.10 7 As
Justice Rehnquist stated in Rakas v. Illinois, "one who owns or lawfully
104. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971), the Court used the term "justifiable" to
express Katz's requirement that the expectation of privacy be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable. In Oliver the Court used the term "legitimate." See supra note 63.
105. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 189 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) ("The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's
bundle of property rights."); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (discussing
power to exclude as property strand worthy of compensation under Fifth Amendment takings
clause); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 7 (1936).
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possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy by virtue of [the] right to exclude [others]." 108 Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that Oliver's ownership of his field entitled him
to certain positive rights which reflected the reasonableness of his expec-
tation of privacy.' °9 Nevertheless, the majority held that Oliver had ex-
posed his field to the public, overriding any property right to exclude." 0
Justice Marshall's second factor, the use to which the place is put, argua-
bly weighed in favor of the defendant. Society will recognize some legiti-
mate uses of an open field in which people may expect privacy. The third
factor, the steps taken to ensure that the privacy expectation is under-
stood and respected, also weighed in favor of the defendant Oliver. Oli-
ver had taken precautions to maintain his privacy: He had posted "No
Trespassing" signs along his property and had partially enclosed the field
with a fence. Despite these arguably positive factors, the majority con-
cluded that the defendant could not have manifested a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his open field because such an expectation was not
one society would be willing to accept as reasonable.' 1
The Court expanded the open fields doctrine in California v.
Ciraolo. 112 The Court held that a field exposed to aerial surveillance was
"open" and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment, although
it was sufficiently sheltered from the public at ground level. The defend-
ant had enclosed his marijuana field with a six-foot outer fence and a ten-
foot inner fence." 3 However, on a tip, police conducted aerial surveil-
lance of the field and noticed large marijuana crops."14 The defendant
argued that he had taken normal precautions to maintain his privacy."15
Yet the Court concluded that "[a]ny member of the public flying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that [the] officers
observed.... [The] expectation that his garden was protected from such
observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is pre-
pared to honor."" 6 The determinative factor is whether the public could
readily or even possibly observe the object of the "search" that the police
108. 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978); see also id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[P]roperty rights
reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and
therefore should be considered in determining whether an individual's expectations of privacy are
reasonable.").
109. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 179.
111. Id. at 181.
112. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
113. Id. at 209.
114. Id.
115. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (requiring that defendants seeking
Fourth Amendment protection take "normal precautions" to ensure privacy).
116. Craolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
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conducted. If the field is accessible to the public in one way or another, it
will not be protected.
With the Oliver and Ciraolo decisions, the open fields doctrine was
greatly expanded; open fields are considered exposed to the public if they
can be viewed from any legitimate vantage point. That is, if the public
can generally observe the field itself, objects in the field, or activities con-
ducted in the field, the field will not receive Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. The Court has delineated certain criteria to determine whether the
field is protected. In Oliver, the Court inquired whether the field was
"accessible to the public"-this included trespassers who may wander
onto the field. 117 If it is somewhat likely that the field could be observed,
it will not be protected. In Ciraolo, the field was subject to the "knothole
in the fence" test: If there is an opening, whether it be a hole in a fence
or the sky above the field, the police may look into it.118 Thus privately
owned fields, even ones shielded from most of the public, are not pro-
tected from warrantless searches if it is likely or even possible that the
field may be observed.
B. Closed Containers
Mooney's claims for Fourth Amendment protection rested to a
large degree upon his use of a closed duffel bag and a suitcase to hide his
belongings. The Fourth Amendment protects "persons, houses, papers,
and effects" against unlawful search and seizure. Traditionally, these
items were protected when located in a home. After Katz, the Court
expanded the protection to include personal effects that were not on the
person but were otherwise private.
In United States v. Chadwick," 9 the Court held reasonable the ex-
pectation of privacy in the interior of a footlocker loaded onto a vehi-
cle.120 Although the locker was not in a traditionally protected area, the
117. 466 U.S. at 179.
118. The State of California used the "knothole" analogy in its Petition for Certiorari. See
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210. I have used the analogy as an open fields "test." Other courts have con-
cluded that fields meeting these criteria are not worthy of Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding no Fourth Amendment protection
against invasion of field where millyard surrounded by nothing more than barbed wire fence).
119. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
120. Id. at 11. Although the "automobile exception" requirements of Chadwick have been re-
cently overruled by California v. Acevedo, I11 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), the heightened protection given to
closed containers still exists. This protection developed from a series of cases dealing with searches
of closed containers found in automobiles. The police conducted a search of Mooney's closed con-
tainers under a bridge abutment and not in an automobile; therefore, a discussion of the "automobile
exception" is not within the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the closed container doctrine
with regard to automobile searches, see id.; Catherine A. Shepard, Comment, Search and Seizure:
From Carroll to Ross, the Odyssey of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 221 (1982); see
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expectation of privacy in the interior of the locker was reasonable be-
cause society regards locked footlockers as items in which people expect
privacy.1 21 The Court argued that because society has traditionally
given great deference to the privacy of belongings placed in closed con-
tainers such as luggage, it is reasonable to expect that a closed container
would remain unopened.' 22
The Court expanded this "closed containers" doctrine in Robbins v.
California.t23 There the Court held that the expectation of privacy was
reasonable even in opaque wrappers. The Court expanded the definition
of a closed container: "Once placed within a [closed, opaque] container, a
diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." 124 One who places an object inside any closed container
manifests an intent to keep that item private, and society regards this
privacy interest as reasonable.
C. Abandonment
The protection an individual retains by placing a personal effect in-
side a closed container is lost when that closed container is abandoned.
Abandonment itself does not present a great challenge to search and
seizure scholars: One cannot manifest a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in an item once it has been abandoned. 125 The problem is in deter-
mining when a given item has been abandoned. This question is often
difficult to resolve.
In California v. Greenwood,126 the Court held that there was no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the contents of discarded trash bags left
also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
121. "By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, [one] manifest[s] an expecta-
tion that the contents would remain free from public examination." Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
122. Ia
123. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). As with Chadwick, Robbins has been overruled in part by Acevedo
with regard to the automobile exception.
124. Id at 426. The Court does not distinguish between types of containers: "What one person
may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." Id.
125. Kg., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (holding that discarded papers found
in a hotel wastebasket after defendant had vacated the room were not subjects of Fourth Amend-
ment protection); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (holding that no seizure occured where
items were dropped during police chase). Although these cases pre-date Katz, the law created by
them is still good: Katz acknowledged the limitations on Fourth Amendment protection when the
object searched has been exposed to public scrutiny. "What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389
U.S. at 351; see also Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and
Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 Buiu. L. REv. 399, 400 (1971) ('[W]here one
abandons property, he is said to bring his right of privacy therein to an end.., and the property so
abandoned may be seized without probable cause.").
126. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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out for collection. 127 Although the closed garbage bags were opaque
containers, once the owner discarded them outside the curtilage, the ex-
pectation of privacy ceased to be reasonable. Because the area was
"readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public," the expectation that the bags would remain pri-
vate was unreasonable. 12
The decision in Greenwood marked a retreat from previous closed
container decisions. Under prior cases, the expectation of privacy in
items placed in closed containers was generally assumed to be reasonable
because society regards any container like luggage to be inherently pri-
vate. 129 But the Katz test required a determination of surrounding fac-
tors to ascertain the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of
privacy; deeming certain objects inherently private seemed too much like
the old "constitutionally protected area" standard. Chadwick held that
the expectation of privacy was reasonable in a double-locked footlocker;
Greenwood determined that such protection of closed containers does not
extend to trash bags that have been abandoned and are accessible to the
public. Under Katz, the only question for a court is whether society is
willing to accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the searched
object. Even the most closed and secret possession may be searched
without warrant if society thinks that the expectation of privacy was de-
feated by surrounding circumstances such as abandonment.
Greenwood represents another example of the reasonable/legitimate
expectations dichotomy.1 30 Greenwood almost certainly believed that
his trash bags left on the curb would remain free from inspection (thus
satisfying the subjective component). In fact, this belief was probably
reasonable given the slim chance of the police searching his trash. How-
ever, the police officer's discovery of the evidence did not violate Green-
wood's Fourth Amendment rights because the expectation of privacy
was not one society is willing to accept as reasonable. Because the gar-
bage collector himself could have sorted through the garbage or allowed
someone else to do so, society could not view such an expectation of
privacy as reasonable.1 31 The fact that there was little chance of someone
actually discovering the narcotics does not increase the legitimacy of the
expectation. Greenwood abandoned his reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the trash bags and could not legitimately expect them to remain
free from inspection.
127. Id. at 40.
128. Id.
129. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
130. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
131. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
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In United States v. Thomas,132 the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, applying Greenwood, set out a test for ascertaining
when an item has been abandoned by a defendant. In Thomas, the de-
fendant, upon seeing the police approaching the courtyard of his apart-
ment, had dropped his gym bag on the second floor landing and exited
the building. The police entered the building, found the bag, and
searched it, discovering various firearms, ammunition, and cocaine.
133
The court held that the expectation of privacy in the contents of the
dropped and abandoned gym bag was not reasonable, although the de-
fendant had intended to return to retrieve the bag.' 34 Thomas summa-
rized the abandonment methodology:
The test for abandonment in the search and seizure context is distinct
from the property law notion of abandonment: it is possible for a per-
son to retain a property interest in an item, but nonetheless to relin-
quish his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. To
determine whether there is abandonment in the fourth amendment
sense, the district court must focus on the intent of the person who is
alleged to have abandoned the... object. The test is an objective one,
and intent may be inferred from "words spoken, acts done, and other
objective facts."' 135
The defendant's conduct-dropping his bag and fleeing-indicated (ob-
jectively) an intent to abandon his possessions, and he therefore lost his
reasonable expectation of privacy. The fact that the defendant actually
(subjectively) intended to retain ownership is irrelevant.
Other courts have relied on the Thomas approach to assessing aban-
donment. It is apparent that abandonment can be effectuated by de-
nouncing ownership 36 or by actively discarding the item.' 37 Thomas
132. 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
133. Id. at 845.
134. Id. The court concluded that the defendant's intention to retrieve the bag had no bearing
on his reasonable expectation of privacy. "The legal significance of Thomas' acts is not altered by
the fact that he might have intended to retrieve the bag later. His ability to do so would depend on
the fortuity that other persons with access to the public hallway would not disturb his bag while it
lay there unattended." Id. at 846 n.5; see United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.
1983) ("[The defendant's] ability to recover the satchel depended entirely upon fate and the absence
of inquisitive (and acquisitive) passers-by.").
135. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 845-46 (citations and footnote omitted).
136. See, ag., United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant who adamantly
denied ownership of luggage checked at airline did not have recourse under Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Because the defendant denied
ownership . . . the bag was legally 'abandoned' and the agents were free to search it without a
warrant."); United States v. Brady, 842 F.2d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[S]pontaneous denial of
ownership, unaffected by police provocation, demonstrates sufficient intent of disassociation to prove
abandonment."). Compare United States v. Sanders, 719 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1983) (defendant who,
believing she was under surveillance, left airport without retrieving checked suitcase, but did not
deny ownership of suitcase when questioned by police, did not relinquish reasonable expectation of
privacy) with United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982) (defendant who left airport
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does not suggest that a person must "assertively clutch" an object at all
times to retain the protection of the Fourth Amendment.1 38 Rather, the
court looks for actions that indicate an intent to relinquish the privacy
interest. One such action is leaving the item in a public place. For exam-
ple, in City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 1 39 the owner of an eyeglass case con-
taining drug paraphernalia relinquished his reasonable expectation of
privacy when he hid the case in a public dry cleaning establishment. The
court held that when "the discard occurs in a public place where the
defendant cannot reasonably have any continued expectancy of privacy
in the discarded property, the property will be deemed abandoned for the
purposes of search and seizure."1' 4
Another factor that can affect abandonment is how long the defend-
ant leaves the object open to public scrutiny.1 41 The common theme in
airline checked luggage cases is that when a person entrusts an airline
employee or similar person to hold an object, the reasonable expectation
of privacy is not relinquished.1 42 However, the expectation of privacy
ceases to be reasonable when the person denies ownership or takes ac-
tions indicating an intent to abandon the object, such as leaving it in
public for an unreasonable amount of time.
without retrieving checked luggage and denied having any luggage when questioned by police had
abandoned suitcase for Fourth Amendment purposes). But see State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778,
781 (N.D. 1990) ("[D]isavowal of ownership alone may not be enough to relinquish one's reasonable
expectation of privacy.").
137. See, eg., United States v. Collins, 766 F.2d 219 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (drug defendant
renounced reasonable expectation of privacy when he discarded bag during police chase), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985); People v. Mamon, 457 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. 1990) (same); see also Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Items abandoned during a police chase are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment if the police had probable cause to initiate the chase. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846
n.4. In Thomas, the bag was abandoned before the police confronted the defendant. Thus, the court
did not accept Thomas's argument that the police induced his abandonment. Id. "[O]nce the bag
was abandoned, the officers did not require probable cause to search it." Id. at 847.
138. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846.
139. 237 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1975).
140. Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted).
141. See, e-g., United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1986) (defendant who left suitcase
for only twenty-four hours in trunk of automobile that had caught fire had abandoned suitcase for
Fourth Amendment purposes); cf United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976) (defend-
ant's actions of dropping suitcase and taking three steps away from it before arrest not sufficient to
constitute abandonment under Fourth Amendment); State v. Beresford, 592 A.2d 882 (Vt. 1991)
(defendant who made no attempt to leave scene of accident had not abandoned shaving kit found
twenty-five feet from overturned truck).
142. Likewise, in United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court held that a
defendant who had deposited a plastic bag with a grocery store employee had not relinquished his
reasonable expectation of privacy. "Most... did not place his bag within the reach of the world
generally." Id. at 197.
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D. Trespass143
Although Katz expanded Fourth Amendment protection to include
areas other than just the strict confines of a home or office,144 this protec-
tion does not extend to places where the defendant has no property inter-
est. Just as a defendant who leaves his suitcase in Grand Central Station
for two weeks has abandoned his reasonable expectation of privacy, a
stowaway on a cruise ship cannot complain of warrantless invasion when
his unattended belongings are searched. The question of trespass has
been difficult to resolve; at some point a trespasser has shared his space
with so many others that any expectation of privacy must be
unreasonable. 145
The Supreme Court's original test for Fourth Amendment standing
required that the defendant be "legitimately on the premises. ' 146 Thus a
defendant could not even challenge a search unless he was legitimately
on the premises searched. In Rakas v. Illinois, however, the Court aban-
doned the "legitimately on the premises" test. 147 Rakas dealt with the
privacy expectation of passengers in a getaway car driven by the owner.
Although the defendants were "legitimately on the premises" in the sense
that they had the owner's permission to be in the car, the Court con-
cluded that they could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the glove compartment and in the area under the carseats: "Like the
trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passen-
ger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of
privacy." 148
In any Fourth Amendment inquiry, a court must examine all the
surrounding circumstances. 149 And, because property rights will often
bear on the reasonableness of the privacy expectation, 150 trespassers will
not usually have reasonable expectations of privacy.151 Courts have gen-
erally agreed that trespassers lose much of the protection of the Fourth
143. Cases analyzed in this Section do not necessarily involve trespass in the strict sense of the
word. Rather, this Note analyzes cases in which individuals do not have a proprietary interest in the
area searched.
144. "[A] person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that
the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place."
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
145. See id. at 146.
146. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
147. 439 U.S. at 143.
148. Id. at 148-49.
149. Id. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring).
150. See supra Part II(B).
151. It is important to note that the trespasser retains the protection of the Fourth Amendment
with regard to his person. A person does not lose all protection by stepping onto another's property.
The trespasser cases discussed in this Section usually deal with a semi-permanent trespass in which
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Amendment with regard to their "homes." The Tenth Circuit held in
United States v. Ruckman 15 2 that a trespasser in a cave located on public
land could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy153 although
he had lived in the cave for eight months, had built a door on the cave,
and had even fashioned a crude bed.154 Because the area was accessible
to animals and other people, it was unreasonable to expect privacy. Fur-
thermore, the defendant could have been expelled from the land at any
time.155 Thus the court determined that the warrantless search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the First Circuit held in
Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon 15 6 that squatters on public land had no
legitimate expectation of privacy. 157
In G. R. v. State,158 a trespasser in a log cabin was found not to have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the surrounding area.159 The
case did not decide the more interesting question of whether the defend-
ant could have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of
the cabin in which he frequently trespassed. A determination of this
question would depend on how accessible the cabin was to the public at
the searched area is the trespasser's "home." Because a court must assess the reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy based on of all the surrounding circumstances, a technical trespasser will be
protected against unreasonable searches when his conduct indicates an intention to keep his belong-
ings private. This would certainly apply to an individual who steps onto another's property. The
important question for cases like Mooney is whether a person who lives on public land can reason-
ably expect privacy in his home and his belongings.
152. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1478 (McKay, J., dissenting).
155. Id at 1473.
156. 518 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1975).
157. "The plaintiffs knew they had no colorable claim to occupy the land .... That fact alone
makes ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 11; see also
People v. Smith, 448 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (ordering hearing on Fourth Amendment rights
of subtenant of a squatter); People v. Sumlin, 431 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (casual guest of
employee of squatter in city-owned abandoned building did not have reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy). Amezquita relied on cases involving similar fact situations. For cases involving expired rental
periods, see United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[WMhen the term of a guest's
occupancy of a room expires, the guest loses his exclusive right to privacy in the room."); United
States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1970) ("When the rental period has elapsed, the guest
has completely lost his right to use the room and any privacy associated with it."); State v. Roff, 424
P.2d 643 (Wash. 1967) (holding police search of hotel room twenty-four hours after expiration of
rental period not violative of Fourth Amendment). Of course, with an expired hotel rental period,
the guest knows that the room will be entered because the presumption is that the guest will not
renew. Thus his expectation of privacy after that time is clearly unreasonable. The situation is
different for apartment and house rentals, where the renter may renew for another period. E.g.,
United States v. Botelho, 360 F. Supp. 620 (D. Haw. 1973) (holding that nonpayment of rent, elec-
tricity, and telephone bills does not make defendant's expectation of privacy in cottage unreasonable
even though defendant was notified orally of pending eviction).
158. 638 P.2d 191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
159. Id at 196.
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large. If the defendant could not expect his belongings to remain free
from invasion from other people, then he should not expect privacy from
the police. "Even if [they] believed the land to be private property, they
were aware it was not theirs .... [T]hey had little reason to believe that
others would not trespass as they had." 16°
The underlying rationale in trespasser cases is that a lack of prop-
erty rights diminishes the reasonableness of a privacy expectation. A
trespasser cannot fall back on positive property entitlements (which may
include the right to exclude others).1 61 Furthermore, the area is shared
with so many others that the defendant cannot reasonably expect that the
area will remain free from inspection by others. Of course, "the [Fourth]
Amendment does not shield only those who have title to the searched
premises."1 62 Nevertheless, lack of property rights in an area will dimin-
ish the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in that area. It is
important, however, to distinguish between searches of an area (which
may reveal exposed items) and searches of the person. If an individual
possesses items on his person, the fact that he trespasses onto another's
land will have little effect upon his expectation of privacy.163 However,
when a person leaves belongings unattended on another's property or on
public property, the expectation of privacy is diminished.164 Similarly,
when an individual without a proprietary interest in the land subjected to
a police search seeks Fourth Amendment protection in that area, his lack
of property rights will surely defeat his reasonable expectation of privacy
in that area.1 65 He may, however, exclude others from belongings he
physically possesses at the time of the search-those items will be pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment.
160. Id. at 197.
161. The Amezquita court likened the squatters' Fourth Amendment rights to those of car
thieves. See Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 11; State v. Boutot, 325 A.2d 34 (Me. 1974) (holding that
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in car he had stolen); see also Meade v. Cox, 310
F. Supp. 233, 238 (W.D. Va.) ("No one can expect or demand privacy in premises or places which
are wrongfully possessed or in which no interest or ownership can be shown .... "), aff'd on another
ground, 438 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1970); State v. Pokini, 367 P.2d 499, 509 (Haw. 1961) ("[A] tres-
passer who places his property where it has no right to be has no right of privacy as to that
property.").
162. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968).
163. "An individual who enters a place defined to be 'public' for Fourth Amendment analysis
does not lose all claims to privacy .... [Tihe Fourth Amendment's protection] against... unrea-
sonable seizure of effects upon the person remain[s] fully applicable." Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 179 n.10 (1984).
164. See United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666-67 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[P]rivacy expectations
... vary with the location of the property.").
165. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th
Cir. 1986); Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1975).
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IV. CONSTRUCTING HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS: STATE V MOONEY
The Supreme Court of Connecticut struggled with the post-Katz
caselaw. The court recognized a "tension" between the protection tradi-
tionally given to closed containers and the lack of protection given to
property left in open fields and public areas. 166 Although the court ac-
knowledged that the abandonment cases tended to weigh in favor of the
state, 167 it did not find the caselaw controlling because no abandonment
case dealt with the specific circumstances of Mooney's case. Instead, the
majority created "first principles"' 68 to decide the outcome. Because the
closed containers represented Mooney's "last shred of privacy," and be-
cause holding otherwise would force Mooney to forgo Fourth Amend-
ment protection for all belongings not physically possessed at the time of
the search, the court held that Mooney had had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the closed containers.' 69 Nevertheless, it is important to
understand why Mooney's claim to a reasonable expectation in his
"home" must fail in order to understand why his closed container claim
must fail as well.170
A. Invasion of the "Home"
It is apparent that the Fourth Amendment was originally created to
protect people from invasion of their homes. This most sacred protection
is and has been the heart of search and seizure law: "The poorest man
may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the Crown."' 7' How-
ever, this protection must be within reason. A person may not lay down
in the middle of the local bus depot and declare, "From here on out, this
space is my home. Nobody touch my stuff-I expect some privacy."
Mooney's home was neither cottage nor bus depot, but was rather some-
thing in between.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut never addressed Mooney's first
claim concerning his "home," as it found merit in Mooney's closed
container claim.' 72 To assess the privacy interest Mooney claimed in his
166. State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 155 (Conn.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
167. Id at 159.
168. Id at 160.
169. Id. at 161.
170. The two claims are closely linked. See id. at 172 (Callahan, J., dissenting) ("My conclusion
that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the area under the abutment leads me
to conclude that he also could not have reasonably expected that the contents of his containers
would remain inviolate if left there unattended.").
171. LASSON, supra note 28, at 49 (quoting William Pitt's famous speech on general warrants).
172. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152.
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"home," we must look to whether Mooney could reasonably have ex-
pected privacy in the area in which he lived. We can turn to the frame-
work Justice Marshall suggested in Oliver v. United States.173 First, we
look to positive law for entitlements that could support a claim of pri-
vacy. Second, we examine the use to which the land is put. If the land is
used in such a way that is recognized as requiring privacy, it will lend
credence to Mooney's theory. Third, we look to whether the defendant
took normal precautions to put others on notice that he expected
privacy.
Mooney lived for four weeks under a bridge abutment under a high-
way overpass. The abutment was separated from the road by a steep
embankment covered by crushed stone and heavy underbrush. The land
was owned by the Connecticut Department of Transportation. Because
Mooney had no property interest in the land, he could not exclude
others; this alone made his expectation of privacy in the area under the
bridge unreasonable. Furthermore, the area can be considered an open
field in which no reasonable expectation of privacy could inhere. 174
The area under the bridge abutment was public land. A distinction
must be drawn, however, between the type of public land where the pub-
lic is generally invited, such as a park, and a bridge abutment owned by
the state, where people are not generally invited. Such a distinction actu-
ally enhances Mooney's argument as fewer people would probably enter
such an area. But the effect of such a distinction is that Mooney could be
a trespasser on the public land. The extent to which public land can be
used can surely be regulated.175 People are not allowed to live in public
parks. They certainly are not permitted to live under bridges although
they may be technically "public land." Thus Mooney could not reason-
ably expect that this area would remain free from inspection or that he
would not be ousted. In fact, Mooney acknowledged that a highway
worker had confronted him once during the four weeks in which he lived
under the bridge.176 Given this confrontation, Mooney could not have
reasonably expected that the land would remain private.
A fact situation similar to that in Mooney occurred in United States
v. Ruckman, where a trespasser in a public cave was found not to have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.' 77 In Ruckman, the police en-
tered a cave that the defendant considered his home. The defendant
173. 466 U.S. 170, 189 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 106.
174. See supra Part III(A).
175. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding con-
stitutionality of regulation limiting "camping" in United States parks to designated areas).
176. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151.
177. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
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could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, as he had no
right to exclude others from the cave. Furthermore, he could have been
ousted at any time.
Even where a defendant makes an attempt to create positive rights,
the expectation of privacy is not necessarily reasonable. In Amezquita v.
Hernandez-Colon, squatters built houses on land that they knew was not
theirs. 1 78 Ruckman built a door and walls in his cave. 179 Yet in both of
these cases, the courts found that others had just as much right to enter
the premises as the defendants, and thus concluded that searches of the
defendants' living areas were not violative of the Fourth Amendment.' 80
Mooney knew that others could trespass as he had done. He had en-
countered a highway worker once before. Moreover, Mooney had
moved from his previous location because another homeless person had
started camping nearby.18' He lacked any positive entitlement to the
land on which he lived.
Even if Mooney owned the bridge abutment, the search of the area
would yet have been permissible under the open field doctrine. Because
"an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities con-
ducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home,"1 82 a warrantless search of the open area under the bridge
would have been permissible. The land was most certainly accessible to
the public. Thus under Oliver and Ciraolo, the search would have been
legitimate as an open field search.
Justice Marshall's second inquiry in assessing the expectation of pri-
vacy in an area examines the use to which the land is put. Some public
areas are especially conducive to privacy. For example, in Katz, the de-
fendant entered a telephone booth and closed the door behind him. Tele-
phone booths are the types of places in which people expect privacy
notwithstanding the fact that they are open to the public. 183 Although
178. "The plaintiffs knew they had no colorable claim to occupy the land .... That fact alone
makes ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy." 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st
Cir. 1975).
179. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472.
180. "[WMhether a place constitutes a person's 'home' for [Fourth Amendment] purpose[s] can-
not be decided without any attention to its location or the means by which it was acquired; that is,
whether the occupancy and construction were in bad faith is highly relevant." Amezquita, 518 F.2d
at 12.
181. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151.
182. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
183. Katz did have a property interest in the telephone booth-he was a licensee of the space.
His Fourth Amendment protection could easily be based on positive property rights, even usufructu-
ary ones, because he had the right to exclude others from the telephone booth while he was using it.
After he deposited his dime, he possessed certain discernible positive entitlements. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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Mooney sought to preserve the bridge abutment as his home, such an
area does not share this quality because it is not enclosed and it is not
recognized by society as a private place.
The third factor in determining the reasonableness of the expecta-
tion of privacy in a given space is "[w]hether a person 'took normal pre-
cautions to maintain his privacy.' "184 A court must ask whether steps
were taken to ensure privacy, and if so, whether these steps have been
understood and respected by the public. Mooney had taken considerable
steps to ensure his privacy. His belongings included "a blanket used as a
mattress, a rolled-up sleeping bag, a closed cardboard box, a suitcase, a
small closed duffel bag, and paper trash."1815 He used the cement and
metal beams of the highway support structures as shelves and placed all
his belongings there, except for the duffel bag, the blanket, and the trash,
which were left on the ground. During the one-month period that he
lived under the bridge, Mooney was the only occupant. He left the area
every day, but secured his belongings so that they could not be seen from
the road.
Mooney had done everything that could have been expected of him
to ensure his privacy. However, resolution of Justice Marshall's third
factor depends on whether the public would understand and respect this
privacy. In Oliver, the defendant had owned the land on which the po-
lice trespassed, had placed "No Trespassing" signs throughout the area,
and had enclosed most of the land with a fence.186 Still, the Court found
that Oliver could not have reasonably expected privacy because the land
was "accessible to the public"-including trespassers who might have
wandered onto the land.187 In Ciraolo, the defendant had completely
enclosed his land with a ten-foot outer fence and a six-foot inner fence.
188
The Court found that Ciraolo's land was not protected against police
searches because it was exposed to public scrutiny from passing air-
planes.18 9 Although both Oliver and Ciraolo took normal precautions to
maintain their privacy, 190 the public could view each of their fields from
some vantage point. The Oliver Court concluded that "No Trespassing"
signs do not effectively shield an open field from the public. 191 The
184. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 193 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 105 (1980)).
185. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 150. All the facts in this discussion are taken from the Connecticut
Supreme Court decision.
186. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
187. Id at 179.
188. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
189. Id. at 213-14.
190. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
191. 466 U.S. at 179.
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Ciraolo Court concluded that an individual who takes measures to re-
strict some points of view does not thereby protect his field from being
viewed from other vantage points where the public has a right to be.192
By contrast, Mooney was not on his own property. He did not shield the
abutment by a fence. He did not even place "No Trespassing" signs near
the bridge. The only measure he took to ensure his privacy was to place
his belongings where they could not be seen. This action is insufficient
under Oliver and Ciraolo because the items could be viewed from some
other vantage point. It is therefore impossible to conclude that Mooney
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under the bridge.
A further argument can be made to show why Mooney could not
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under the
bridge. Some courts have argued that the owner of the land can consent
to the search of the area where a trespasser or squatter lives. 193 Because
the State of Connecticut owns the land, it can consent to the land being
searched. As long as the user of the property has assumed the risk that
the owner will consent to a search of the land, he has no recourse if
consent is in fact given. 194 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court
would ever adopt such a theory. Nevertheless, under the current ex-
panded open fields doctrine of Oliver and Ciraolo,'95 and Rakas and
other "trespass" cases, 196 Mooney's claim that his "home" was searched
in violation of the Fourth Amendment must fail.
B. Search of the Closed Containers
Mooney's second claim was that the police violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they searched his closed containers. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed with Mooney; the admission of the
evidence found under the bridge abutment was held to be prejudicial er-
ror, and the case was remanded for a new trial. 197 The court reached this
192. 476 U.S. at 213.
193. See e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1974) ("A
trespasser must be deemed to assume the risk that the owner of the property will consent to its
search."); see also Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 12 n.7 (1st Cir. 1975) (describing
consent theory).
194. The police consulted the District Attorney's Office prior to the search of the bridge area.
The District Attorney determined that no search warrant was needed. Telephone Interview with
Judith Rossi, Assistant State's Attorney (Jan. 8, 1992).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 97-118.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 147-65. I refer to Rakas as a "trespass" case only to the
extent that it concluded that an individual without a proprietary interest could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an area shared with others.
197. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 161. As indicated earlier, supra note 23, Mooney pleaded no contest
to first-degree manslaughter and received a fifteen-year sentence, to be suspended after seven years.
He will be eligible for parole in late 1992.
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conclusion by applying illegitimate criteria; under a correct interpreta-
tion of the Greenwood standard, Mooney's closed containers should have
been deemed abandoned such that the warrantless search of their interi-
ors would not have been violative of the Fourth Amendment. Open
fields cases like Oliver and Ciraolo support this conclusion. Further-
more, the Thomas court, applying these Supreme Court rulings, con-
cluded that abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes can result
from conduct similar to Mooney's.
After the police had arrested Mooney, they found out where he was
living and searched the area. Upon arriving at the bridge abutment, a
police officer opened Mooney's closed duffel bag and found a large quan-
tity of quarters. He did not open the other items at that time. The be-
longings were "inventoried" by the police department at a later time.
They discovered a size 38 belt 198 inside the cardboard box. The duffel
bag contained about $700 in quarters, a pair of bloodstained pants, and
some jewelry. 199
The Mooney court relied on three factors in holding that the defend-
ant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: the search involved the inte-
rior of luggage to which society traditionally affords a great expectation
of privacy; the police knew the defendant regarded the area as his home;
and the search occurred while the defendant was under arrest for the
purpose of obtaining evidence (and thereby "caused" any possible aban-
donment). These three factors must be dealt with one at a time. First,
although his belongings were closed containers, Mooney abandoned
them for Fourth Amendment purposes. Second, the fact that the police
knew Mooney regarded the area as his home has no bearing on the rea-
sonable expectation of the defendant. Third, police motive is irrelevant
to the question of whether or not the defendant had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Besides, had Mooney been with his belongings at the
time of the search, the search would yet have been valid as a search inci-
dent to arrest.
1. Closed Containers. Closed containers are traditionally given
great protection under the Fourth Amendment. Society regards items
such as suitcases as inherently private. However, when an individual
198. The victim wore a size 38. Mooney did not. Brief for Respondent at 5, Connecticut v.
Mooney, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991) (No. 90-1887). Mooney claimed that he got the belt from a woman
who had left it on a park bench. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151.
199. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151. Mooney's accomplice identified the pants as the ones Mooney
was wearing on the night of the crime. Brief for Respondent at 5, Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (No.
13,737).
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abandons his belongings, he is said to relinquish his reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 2° ° The question is whether Mooney's actions constituted
abandonment.
Abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes, as we have seen, is
different from the property law concept. A person may retain his owner-
ship of an object yet still lose his reasonable expectation of privacy. In
Greenwood, the defendant deposited his trash bags on the curb outside
his house. This act was sufficient to constitute abandonment because
Greenwood "exposed [his] garbage to the public. '201 Abandonment in
the Fourth Amendment context depends on whether the objects are sub-
ject to the scrutiny of the public. Mooney left his closed containers
under a bridge. Although he "tucked them away," the closed containers
were still exposed to "animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public." 202 It makes no difference that Greenwood ac-
tively discarded the trash bags whereas Mooney intended to retain own-
ership in his belongings. The test for abandonment is an objective one
which depends upon the individual's conduct-" 'words spoken, acts
done, and other objective [factors].' "203 Mooney's conduct-leaving his
belongings unattended under a bridge abutment-was sufficient to estab-
lish abandonment; his intent to retain ownership was irrelevant. Justice
Callahan, dissenting in Mooney, reached the same conclusion: "[T]he
common theme underlying the abandonment cases.., is that it is un-
likely that a person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
closed container left unattended in a place that is readily accessible to the
public." 2°4 Also irrelevant was the fact that other people who are likely
to come upon Mooney's belongings would be breaking the law by steal-
ing them. The correct inquiry is whether the closed containers would
have been free from inspection, not whether it would have been unlawful
to remove or to inspect the containers.
One need not "assertively clutch an object in order to retain the
protection of the [F]ourth [A]mendment. ' '20 - But the individual who
200. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to
the public... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
201. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
202. Id. (citations omitted).
203. United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v.
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973)); see also City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365,
370 (Miin. 1975) ("[Defendant] argues... that his intention was merely to hide the case, not to
relinquish his right of ownership. That is not the test.").
204. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172 (Callahan, J., dissenting); see also California v. Acevedo, I11 S.
Ct. 1982, 1994 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ('IT]he search of a closed container, outside a privately
owned building, with probable cause to believe that the container contains contraband... is not one
of those searches whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant.").
205. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846.
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leaves his closed containers unattended in a place accessible to the public
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents for the
same reason that he cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area as a whole. Oliver and Ciraolo support this view. Just as Oliver
and Ciraolo exposed their fields to public scrutiny, Mooney exposed his
objects to public scrutiny. Whether or not the public would have actu-
ally inspected his belongings is irrelevant. The distinction drawn be-
tween reasonable and legitimate expectations of privacy is crucial here.
Mooney may have actually expected privacy.20 6 This expectation may
have been reasonable-there may have been little actual chance of in-
spection.20 7 Nevertheless, the law will not prohibit a warrantless search
of these abandoned containers, because the expectation of privacy was
not legitimate.
2. Police Knowledge of Mooney's "Home. " The court considered
important the fact that the police knew that Mooney considered the area
his "home." The police motive, in the majority's view, was relevant in
assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy that the defendant exhib-
ited. As the dissenting Justice Callahan noted, however, the subjective
motives of the police could have no bearing on whether Mooney's expec-
tation of privacy was reasonable.20 8 The fact that the police knew
Mooney lived under the bridge abutment was simply irrelevant to the
general inquiry of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable.
3. Mooney's Arrest "Caused" the Abandonment. The majority's
decision in Mooney rests to some degree on the fact that had the defend-
ant not been under arrest, his belongings would have been in his posses-
sion and not abandoned under Greenwood and Thomas. This argument
can be dealt with in three ways. First, Mooney had abandoned his be-
longings before he was arrested. The police could have searched the
bridge area first, found the items, and then arrested Mooney. As he was
not arrested at the bridge abutment, the items were already abandoned.
The abandonment was a result of Mooney's actions, not a result of his
arrest. Each time he left the abutment he abandoned his reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. Whether or not he was present at the bridge area at
206. Mooney admitted, however, that he knew the land was state property and that there was
"no reason why someone else could not enter or live in the area where he was living." Mooney, 588
A.2d at 151. It is improbable that Mooney knew this and yet expected privacy in the interior of his
closed containers. Mooney's two claims are closely linked in this way-his expectation of privacy in
the closed containers was probably no greater than his expectation of privacy in the area.
207. This, too, is doubtful. Mooney admitted that a highway worker came upon him during the
time he lived under the bridge. Id. Mooney was acutely aware that other homeless people could
wander through this area and search his belongings.
208. Id at 174 (Callahan, L, dissenting).
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the time of the search (allowing him to "reclaim" his belongings) was a
matter of pure luck.
Second, the motive of the police in obtaining evidence is irrelevant
because it is the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation that is to
be assessed, not the conduct of the police. The police motive in arresting
Mooney cannot affect this expectation or whether society views it as
reasonable.
Third, had Mooney been at the bridge abutment at the time of the
search, the search would have been legitimate as a search incident to a
lawful arrest. 2°9 Therefore, the majority's reliance on the police's role in
causing the abandonment was unwarranted. The police had a warrant
for Mooney's arrest; they would have found him at the bridge abutment,
arrested him, and searched his possessions at that time. Mooney had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings when he left them;
and when he was with them, they could have been searched anyway.
Under New York v. Belton, the police can search the contents of any
containers found within the passenger compartment of an automobile af-
ter a lawful arrest of the occupant.210 Thus it seems unlikely that
Mooney would have fared any better had he been "at home" the whole
time.211
The Supreme Court of Connecticut applied an erroneous standard
to reach the conclusion that Mooney's closed containers were protected
by the Fourth Amendment. The court separated the closed containers
from the area in which they were located. This approach violates the
fundamental assumption of the Chadwick-Sanders rule.21 2 The "auto-
mobile exception" developed based on an understanding that the location
of the closed container is essential. In assessing the expectation of pri-
vacy that a defendant might have, it is critical to consider the surround-
ing circumstances, such as the location of the objects and their
209. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (allowing search of arrestee's person and area
within immediate control); see also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (permitting warrant-
less entry of premises incident to arrest elsewhere); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (hold-
ing that warrantless search of pockets of jacket left in automobile was a search incident to lawful
arrest).
210. 453 U.S. at 460.
211. The only case to deal squarely with the intent to retrieve abandoned closed containers is
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989). But the court there concluded that the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were "not altered by the fact that he might have intended to
retrieve the bag later." Id. at 846 n.5. "His ability to do so would depend on the fortuity that other
persons with access to the public hallway would not disturb his bag while it lay there unattended."
Id.
212. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Although this rule has been overruled recently by California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), the
location of the searched item is still crucial. See id. at 1991; supra note 120.
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accessibility to the public. The court further erred in placing emphasis
upon the fact that Mooney would have returned to retrieve his belong-
ings. Mooney's intent to return had no bearing on his expectation of
privacy-he had already abandoned the items at the time of his arrest;
or, had he been at the bridge at the time, his belongings would likely have
been searched incident to his lawful arrest. Again, the courts do not
draw a distinction between items that are discarded permanently and
those the owner intends to retrieve. The test is an objective one, deter-
mined by the individual's outward conduct, not his intent. Furthermore,
the court mistakenly concluded that the motive of the police in searching
the closed containers was relevant. It seems clear that the police motives
could not have affected the expectations of the defendant, nor could they
have changed the defendant's conduct.2 13 The majority's reliance on the
fact that the police knew the defendant thought the area was his home
results in greater protection for a homeless person who leaves his belong-
ings under a bridge abutment than for a homeowner who places his be-
longings there.2 14 The Fourth Amendment looks beyond subjective
expectations: If the conduct is assessed objectively, the same conduct
cannot provide different results based on the homeowner status of the
individual.
C. Implications
The homeless cannot expect privacy in their belongings left unat-
tended in public places. The implications of this conclusion are minor.
A correct application of the Fourth Amendment to cases such as Mooney
does not create a discernible change in what a homeless individual can
reasonably expect.
Consider, for example, the trespasser. In Ruckman, the dissent
presented an analogy of a camper on public land whose visiter pass had
expired. 215 A person may in certain instances have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy while trespassing. The fact that the defendant is trespass-
ing is not determinative; the surrounding circumstances need to be
assessed to determine whether the expectation of privacy was reasonable.
A camper whose pass has just expired can safely assume his tent will not
be searched, because the tent gives him certain rights to exclude. Even if
213. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 n.2 (1986) (stating that police purpose for
conducting search is irrelevant in determining defendants' reasonable expectations).
214. See Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173 (Callahan, J., dissenting) ("Though the intent of the majority
in providing heightened fourth amendment protection for the homeless... may be admirable, I find
no support ... for the addition of a 'circumstances of the searched' prong to the analysis of whether
an expectation of privacy is reasonable.").
215. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1476 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting).
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technically trespassing, the camper has certain discernible property
rights in the tent. He also has property rights to his person.216 That is
why a child who crosses a neighbor's property on the way to school does
not subject himself to warrantless searches-the trespasser retains his
right to exclude others from his person. Trespassing alone does not de-
feat the individual's Fourth Amendment rights because trespassing alone
does not defeat the individual's property rights.
Now consider the case of abandonment. A person who leaves his
belongings where they are accessible to public scrutiny relinquishes the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, despite his continuing property
interest. The reason for this result is that a person loses the ability to
exclude others and to exercise dominion over his property when he is not
present. Although "title" to the belongings remains intact-the person
has not abandoned the items in a property context-the person cannot
expect privacy in the objects because he has forsaken certain key prop-
erty entitlements. For example, the camper could leave his knapsack in
his tent on public land without abandoning his expectation of privacy.
The tent supplies the necessary property entitlements. But if the camper
should leave his knapsack on the ground, in an open public area, he may
have abandoned his expectation of privacy. The inquiry is not whether
someone would inspect the knapsack or steal it, but whether or not it
would be reasonable, in light of the surrounding circumstances, to expect
that someone would not do so. Suppose a camper leaves his knapsack on
a bicycle unattended for a short time in order to use the park rest-
room.217 Would he give up his expectation of privacy? To answer this
question requires an assessment of how reasonable it is to leave the item
unprotected. The fact that the knapsack is on a bicycle provides some
protection-people are less likely to examine an item left on a bicycle
than an item left alone. But the longer the camper leaves his belongings
unattended, the more likely it is that they will be inspected-if not by a
thief, then at least by a park ranger seeking to identify the owner. If,
while the camper is using the restroom, the park ranger should notice the
backpack, examine it to determine the owner, and incidentally discover
cocaine, would the camper be able to suppress the evidence? Again, any
examination of the expectations of privacy of the individual will depend
on the surrounding circumstances. And these circumstances will depend
on an assessment of his property interest.
216. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 328 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed. 1960)
(1698) ("[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person.").
217. See Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173 n.3 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Mooney decision represents an illegitimate approach to Fourth
Amendment law in an uncharted realm. Since Katz, the Supreme Court
has consistently looked toward positive property entitlements in assess-
ing the defendant's privacy interest. Such an approach is necessary to
determine what constitutes a "reasonable" expectation of privacy. By
acknowledging the importance of such concepts in the search and seizure
context, the Court can prevent a double standard in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Using property rights as a basis for Fourth Amendment
rights, it could much more easily assess the expectation of privacy with-
out diminishing the rights of criminal defendants.
An assumption of this Note has been that the law should apply
equally to all members of society. Special protection could be given to
homeless people under state constitutions without violating the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection;
homeowners are not a protected class requiring a strict scrutiny analysis.
But a society functions better when everyone receives the same protec-
tion of the law. Furthermore, in evaluating the reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy, what criteria are to be used? The right to exclude
others has been and always will be measured by the yardstick of prop-
erty. This ultimate truth is at the heart of what the Fourth Amendment
protects-the right to be let alone. It is a sad but true fact that those who
cannot shut out the world will be subject to its prying eyes. But to create
two standards of Fourth Amendment protection in order to rectify the
"injustice" of homelessness is to ignore the greater principles encom-
passed by the Fourth Amendment.
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